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COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS AND
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: SOME
THEORETICAL AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT AN
INFORMATION ECONOMYt
by JOHN C. LAUTSCH*
The press and politicians increasingly describe the United
States as entering a "post-industrial economic era." Entrepreneurs
in the computer industry speak of a new "information economy."
The Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission five years ago
concluded that the United States is now an "information-dependent
society." The exact meaning of these phrases remains unclear.
They are based, however, on an idea that developments connected
with integrated circuits, stemming from the invention of the transistor in 1948, have now provided the means for spreading computer
power throughout society and that this is somehow changing the
way wealth is generated. This Article explores the nature of the
connection between the efficiency of processing information and the
creation of wealth and some of the problems this process may
generate.
I. AN INFORMATION ECONOMY
The post-industrial age has been described by one writer as "an
age in which information activities dominate our economies and our
societies."' Many writers use similar functional definitions when
they describe our "information" economy. These remarks indicate
t © John C. Lautsch 1982.
* Mr. Lautsch is a Council Member of the American Bar Association's Section
on Science and Technology and is chairman of the Section's Computer Law Division.
He practices law in southern California, where he is the General Counsel of the
Coast Community College District. The views expressed in this Article are not necessarily those of the ABA or the Coast Community College District.
1. Parker, Information Services and Economic Growth, in THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 71, 71 (1981).
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that an "information" economy is similar to an industrial ("smoke
stack") economy, except instead of oil and cars being the dominate
goods produced, computers and telecommunications devices are the
dominate goods produced.
Using this definition, we are indeed close to being an "information" economy that is, an economy based largely upon the production of computer-related goods and services rather than
transportation and energy. Industry newsletters indicate that the
dollar value of the microcomputer industry, including software and
peripherals, was $2.6 billion in 1980. It is predicted to rise to approximately $14 billion by 1985, although some reports enthusiastically
forecast a market of $30 billion by 1985.
Yet, along with this "post-industrial" electronic production, the
more mundane production of food and commodities from our
"smoke stack" industries will have to continue if we wish to continue our present standard of living. Why there should exist such
an urge to mass produce computer-related products in addition to
more traditional industrial products, or why these production activities should be characterized as "post-industrial," remains unclear.
A further aspect of an "information" economy involves the use
of the computer and communication devices now being produced.
As the efficiencies afforded by these new devices grows and their
costs continue to drop, their use will likely become increasingly
more common throughout American society. Several organizations,
such as IBM, I', AT&T, RCA, and the television and radio networks, are consciously attempting to position themselves as the bases of an electronic infrastructure to support use of these
"compunications" devices.
Patterns of computer usage appear to be evolving in a manner
similar to the usage pattern that evolved with automobiles. In addition to the traditional economic endeavors that make use of the accounting, information-processing and production efficiencies
afforded by these new devices, a second tier of significant economic
activity based upon "compunications" is developing. In fact, the
microcomputers manufactured by Radio Shack and Apple have already been referred to as the "Model T's" of our new economy. The
idea of fusing such devices together via telecommunications has led
some to predict that the worldwide dollar value of the world market
for telecommunications will reach approximately $145 billion by
1985. It is forecasted that electronics in general will be the fourth
largest industry in the world by 1990.
Computer-assisted design (CAD) and computer-assisted manufacturing (CAM and robotics) and the '"paperless" office represent
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this second tier of economic activity. The efficiencies afforded by
computerization in this area has led Fortune magazine to speculate
whether this aspect of the "information" economy is in fact a true
2
second industrial revolution.
There may well be a third tier to an "information" economy,
based upon a basic link between the way information is processed
and the way wealth is generated. This link involves new wealth-producing activity based upon modes of processing information that are
inherent to "compunications" systems. Rather than faster production of copy (word processing) or quicker and more accurate bookkeeping or research (computing) or faster and better automation of
traditional industrial production (robotics), these new modes are in
fact new dimensions in communications. They are as new to the use
of information as aviation was to human transportation. It is the
thesis of this Article that a true "post-industrial" or "information"
economy will emerge along with this third tier and that the third tier
may in fact be dramatically wealth-producing.
II.

WHAT IS PRODUCTIVITY?

The preferred source of information about production in the
American economy comes from data obtained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Martin L. Ernst notes that a number of factors make
it difficult to use even this preferred information to measure productivity increases in any commercial arena. When it comes to deterof computerization, these data appear
mining the productive worth
3
to be even more unreliable.
According to Ernst, productivity statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) rely on laborproductivity as the most accurate
indicator of increases in productivity.4 Labor productivity is measured by physical output per employee hour input. Measurement is
based upon the assumption that nonlabor inputs, such as capital,
grow as the labor input grows. Productivity statistics yielded by
such measures, however, do not account for changes in quality of
output, an actual and key feature looked to by consumers in making
purchases. Nor do BLS productivity statistics account for the degree of success of an enterprise in systematizing its operations and
integrating its plant facilities, a common and basic objective of man2. Bylinski, A New IndustrialRevolution is on the Way, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1981, at
106-14.
3. Ernst, New Contextsfor Productivity Analysis, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
PRODUCTrVrrY 52 (Moss ed. 1981).
4. Id.
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agement and one which computerization facilitates. 5 Ernst concludes that "the best of the productivity measurement techniques
for dealing with the outputs most
available are relatively weak
'
sought by current society. "6
Information about labor productivity is even more unreliable in
the service industries. This unreliability usually results in the industrial measure of labor productivity being abandoned in favor of
measurement of total dollar input versus total dollar output. Because of anomalies in the marketplace, such as those produced by
measures are
monopolies and regulated industries, however, dollar
7
just as questionable as labor productivity measures.
Another problem with productivity measures is the accurate allocation of improved efficiency between the enterprise and the customer. For example, query whether the improved speed of a bank's
EFT system, which speeds the bank's customer transaction rate, improves the bank's or the customer's productivity. Furthermore, is
there a productive value to customer convenience? What is to be
made of the fact that the customer in an EFT transaction is compelled to share a greater amount of labor in the transaction (pushing the buttons on the automatic teller)? These considerations
involve measuring an aspect of quality, a factor poorly measured, if
quality plays a sigmeasured at all, by the BLS figures even though
8
nificant role in customer reaction and sales.
Ernst also points out that economists have basic problems defining the size of productivity areas to be measured. In agricultural
production, for example, an economic area where the U.S. economy
is clearly acknowledged as a world leader, Ernst notes that the pre9
ferred measure is output (bushels of wheat) per farmer hour input.
One of the substantial bases for U.S. agricultural production, however, is investment in specialized equipment and chemicals, such as
harvesters and pesticides. Yet, no account is taken in BLS figures of
the labor to produce these materials used by farmers to boost their
production. A more accurate measure of farm production would include a measure of chemical and tractor production, as well as the
cost of distributing the agricultural product to the consumer, that is,
the cost of trucking and supermarkets, all of which influence the
price paid by the consumer.' 0
These considerations indicate that the most reliable productivi5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 54.
at 54-55.
at 54, 60.
at 55-56.
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ty figures are a lot more intuitive than the mere figures would imply.
Moreover, according to Ernst, computerization may be changing the
nature of the marketplace in a manner not comprehensible by BLS
methods-the failure to account for the fact "that we continually are
developing more complex systems. The productivity measures used
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics may have been far more applicable to our farms, and adequate as measures, 40 or 50 years ago.""
The increased complexity and integration of modern productive operations may not even be measurable by presently known techniques. Yet it is the central feature of the widespread application of
computer power.
III.

A BIOLOGICAL COMPARISON

Peter F. Drucker has observed that we are moving away from a
mechanical model of our economy, with high temperatures and
pressures to produce work, towards a more "biological" model, with
lower temperatures and pressures to produce an even greater
amount of work. Less energy in the future will be required for the
production of the same goods and services. 12 One feature of biological organization, as compared with mechanical, is that it is more
highly integrated. In fact, there is a substantially greater degree of
interdependent complexity of even the simplest biological creatures
over the finest machine works.
The processes of the modern computer have been analogized to
the mental processes of biological creatures. Professor A. J. Perlis
of Yale University states:
A misconception still shared by many is that the computer is
merely another multi-purpose tool, a Boy Scout knife of our modern
world. A tool it certainly is, but it is much more. A more proper
view of this mixture of metals and semi-conductors is as a static
and dynamic projection
of the mind, albeit a currently quite primi13
tive projection.
Drucker's observation helps visualize what Perlis' comments may
imply for our economy. If transportation is to the American body
economic what the circulatory system is to a living creature, then
11. Id. at 57.
12. Seminar given by Peter F. Drucker, University of California, Irvine, October
1980.
13. Robert Jastrow, Professor of Astronomy and Geology at Columbia University
and Professor of Earth Science at Dartmouth College, predicts that computers will
equal human intelligence by 1995. See The Post-Human World, 89 Sci. DIG., Jan./Feb.
1981, at 88, and Our Brain's Successor, 89 Sci. DIG., March 1981, at 58. Others vigorously dispute such conclusions. See J. WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN
REASON: FROM JUDGEMENT TO CALCULATION,

ch. 8 (1976).
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the country's budding "compunications" network is its nervous system. To move from postal and plain ordinary telephone service to
data communications may in fact be akin to moving from the crude
intercommunication system of a colony of single celled organisms to
the more sophisticated and integrated nervous system of a warmblooded creature. Mammals are known to make much better use of
the nourishment provided by the environment and to cope with its
dangers much more effectively. In a word, they are more efficient.
This may be the fundamental benefit of computing to our economy.
There is thus an underlying logic to the emergence of successful
businesses, like Federal Express, for example. They are consciously
and deliberately organized and operated like an information
processing system. The founder of Federal Express has remarked
that, just as the coal industry needed railroads to flourish, so modern industry needs a transportation system that can rapidly move
information and electronic parts. Federal Express was designed to
do this. Moreover, Federal Express was itself structured not like a
traditional airline with direct flights connecting high traffic points,
but rather like the central clearinghouse system for banks-all
movement in the system is inward to the "CPU" (Atlanta) where
packages are quickly sorted and then moved outward away from Atlanta towards their destinations. The model is that of a data
14
processing system that cycles once every twenty-four hours.
Our best methods of economic data collection appear to be too
coarse to detect and account for these sorts of qualitative, integrative changes accurately. Because traditional testing for productivity
increases may not comprehend the meaning of a higher order of
complexity of messages in a more integrated real-time environment,
indications of increases in production that such an environment produce may go undetected. The model does imply that the faster and
more correctly information is processed in an organization, the more
15
economically efficient and productive the organization will be.
14. PBS Interview in series Creativity (Feb. 1982).
15. Another novel idea about the impact of computerization is that it is moving us
away from a mechanical, Newtonian model of our environment towards a more relativistic, Einsteinian model where matter and energy are the same and gravity waves
bend light. We thus now begin to encounter problems such as those faced by lawyers
attempting to fit software into the molds of the patent and copyright statutes drafted
to fit a Newtonian view of the world where a machine is a machine and a writing is
copy. Software, however, can be thought of as both a machine part and a writing.
And firmware presents even more difficult conceptual problems. In 1977, a patent
lawyer, considering the bar and benches' attempts to litigate claims in this area, concluded that "[fjrom ... the reported decisions involving the use of stored program
control apparatus it may be appreciated from the shifting cross-currents of Patent Office and government policy and the changing tides of judicial construction present the
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IV. THE COMPUNICATIONS BASE FOR AN INFORMATION
ECONOMY

A.

COMPUNICATIONS

In a seminal speech in 1972, Gordon B. Thompson discussed the
wealth-creating potentials of various communications systems. His
analysis provides a basis for understanding what might be meant by
a post-industrial information economy. Thompson notes that Richard Meier 16 has suggested the existence of "a very close relationship
between the economic health of a community and the state of its
communications. [Meier] points out that for a community to increase in wealth it must have just experienced a significant increase
in the messages flowing within the community. His view is so strong
that he goes on to state that it is a necessary condition that an indensity occur in order that an increase in wealth
crease in message
17
can occur."'
Thompson reports that his experiments, as well as his analysis
of certain historical events, lead him to agree with Meier. He concludes that "[t]here exists no other innovation that we know of
[other than communications systems] that will so alter the means of
converting labor directly into capital over such a large base. This
18
means the creation of jobs. It means the creation of wealth."
Thompson reaches this conclusion by reviewing the history of societies that have undergone communications changes that engendered
tremendous social changes, such as the invention of writing, papyrus, Arabic numerals, and the moveable type press. He concluded
that the communications changes that were significant for those societies were the ones that significantly increased the host society's
standard of living. From his historical analysis and certain experiments, Thompson concluded that three common facets of communications changes exist which, when present, are the fundamental
reasons why the communications changes engendered the significant increases in societal wealth that they did. 19 These aspects are
described below.
patent practitioner with a sea of uncertain concepts in high dilution." Popper, Technology and Programming-Is It a Problem in Definitions?, 5 APLA Q.J. 13, 28-29
(1977).
16. See generally R. MEIER, A COMMUNICATION THEORY OF URBAN GROWTH 151
(1962).
17. Thompson, The Environment, Society and Communications, 38 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 503, 504 (1972).
18. Id. at 507.
19. Id.
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1. A Commonly Accessible Information Base
Thompson concluded that "[eJvery significant communication
revolution has increased the ease with which the host society can
access stored human experience. '20 Every communications change
that led to a significant increase in societal wealth involved the creation of a common information base that was easily accessible by
people at large, and the nature of the new communications system
in fact led to increased popular usage of the database. In computer
marketing parlance, the system was "user friendly."
A classical example is the invention of writing and papyrus
which lead to a literate class, which, in turn, prompted the creation
of the libraries of antiquity. The printing press greatly expanded
the accessibility of a typographical information base. The telephone
is used by many today as an information retrieval system. Computerized databases, such as The Source, accessible via telephone lines
21
from terminals around the country, involve this characteristic.
2. A Common Information Area for Communicants
It seems as if every significant communication revolution has increased the size of the common information space shared by the
communicants. This characteristic is subtle and important. What it
means is that the people using the communications system must be
provided with a means common between or among them to interact
on a real-time basis. Plain ordinary telephone service, which enables both parties to clearly hear each other and themselves at once,
and to talk simultaneously, provides a common information area between the communicants. Radio broadcasting does not because it is
22
not two-way simultaneously.
An experimental system which in part demonstrates the utility
of this aspect of communications systems is "Scribblephone."
Scribblephone, deployed by Canadian Bell, is plain ordinary telephone service coupled with an interactive computergraphics pad.
Each party had a pad and all parties could mark upon it simultaneously, just as all parties to a telephone conversation can talk at once.
Thus, the communicants could react to each other in the usual common acoustical environment, as well as in a new common visual and
manual environment by being able to talk at once and write or draw
on the common pad simultaneously. The system was based upon
the conclusion that people's major instrumentalities for receiving in20. Id. at 505.
21. Id.
22. Thompson & Westelman, Scribblephone-ExtendingMan's Powers of Communication, TELESis 74 (1968).
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formation are their eyes and ears; their major instrumentalities for
23
transmitting information are their voices and their hands.
The Scribblephone system was based upon a subtlety often
overlooked-that the primary means of human communication involves simultaneous and instantaneous interaction in a common environment, i.e., people talking in a room and immediately reacting to
each other with their voices and hands, such as by pointing or drawing. It is the idea that only through voice and hands can we know
the maximum that man is capable of transmitting to us, from his
brain. In the area of common environment and instantaneous interaction, only the voice has been exploited.
The telephone is a satisfying and effective medium of communication because it is in effect "a dark conference room, which people
can enter to communicate with each other. They can talk, they can
24
interrupt, they can talk at once, but they cannot see each other."
No one-way transmitting system, whether it be mail, television, or
video telephone, which involves two separate one-way video channels not providing a common area for immediate and simultaneous
visual action and reaction, is or will be as popular as plain ordinary
telephone service because all lack the aspect of having a common
25
communications space.
According to Thompson, the Scribblephone is "the only communications-oriented common environment since telephone invention. '26 Thompson has further noted that "since we are a symbol
processing society, Scribblephone permits a level of symbolic interaction that has to be experienced to be believed. This is one instance where a communications tool does more than merely
conquer distance; it creates a new level of interaction that is just not
'27
achievable by any other means.
3. Consensus Development
Every significant communication revolution has increased "the
ease with which the host society can discover and develop new
ideas. The complexity, variety and quantity of ideas and the rate at
which they win support throughout the society are increased with
each communication revolution. The ease with which nascent con'28
sensus could be discovered and developed has always increased.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 77.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id. at 78.

27. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 506.

28. Id.
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This facet, perhaps the most subtle of all, means that a communication system that increases societal wealth must ipso facto increase
29
the ease with which common understandings can be reached.
An experimental system which demonstrated in part the utility
of this aspect of communication is the Community Interaction Telephone (Cominterphone) installed by Canadian Bell at Rankin Inlet,
Saskatchewan, Canada. Cominterphone was "a [Canadian Broadcasting Company]-type Low Power Relay Transmitter connected to
the switching equipment of the local exchange. By dialing "0" a
participant can connect with the transmitter equipment and broadcast to the community. The system will handle up to four participants simultaneously on a conference circuit. Reception is via a
''30
standard household AM radio receiver turned to 1110 Kilocycles.
What was built at Rankin Inlet was something like the old fashioned rural American telephone party line. Persons who were living
in Rankin Inlet and were questioned about the system disclosed
that the system was useful more than recreational and that it was
"perceived [by users] primarily as an avenue for relaying and receiving information. '3 1 The researchers concluded "the role of
Cominterphone has been largely that of facilitating the circulation
of information and commentary necessary to the maintenance and
development of the settlement in the creation of a genuine
'32
community.
Systems which incorporate all or even one of the foregoing aspects were described by Thompson as being "extensive;" that is,
their impact was long-range and subtle. Thus they were not to be
directly compared to "intensive" devices, such as word processors.
Intensive information processing devices are intrinsically related to
efficiency and lower labor costs. Extensive systems, theorized
Thompson, are inherently related to creation of new wealth broad33
scale throughout society.
While intensive systems are popular because their benefits are
immediately realized in most cases, development of extensive systems was not, in Thompson's view, being furthered in 1978. Thompson speculated that this may be because (1) computer technologists,
due to their intellectual discipline and training, are not as creative
in the extensive arena as they are in the intensive arena; (2) the le29. See generally, J. BURKE, CONNECTIONS (1978).
30. See Wensley, Cominterphone, Rankin Inlet (1972 Inst. on Northern Studies,
Univ. of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada).
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 81.
33. G. THOMPSON, EVALUATING NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 597-604 (El-

ton ed. 1978).
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gal order encourages the creation of information to be used free,
rather than for profit; and (3) computer systems cannot react to
humans except via clumsy input devices, such as key stroking, that
is, they cannot react to the primary means that humans use to pro34
cess information, speaking and reading.
When Thompson theorized in the seventies, computer technology would not support systems that could significantly improve any
of the three characteristics noted above on a wide scale and over
conventional telecommunications channels. To build a system that
improved upon any or all of the three communications aspects
noted, Thompson concluded, would be to build "essentially [a] universal information storage and retrieval system,. . . which would be
able to accept most anything one might choose to store and from
which anyone could retrieve any bit of stored data. '' 35 In 1972, to significantly increase the size of an information database was to slow
accessibility to such an extent that it became impractical to use.
Thompson referred to this as the Bar-Hillel Conundrum and concluded in 1972 that any data file that was small enough to be able to
access needed information rapidly was too small to be useful. He
speculated, however, that the computer one day would "provide for
another quantum leap" in communications systems, a leap which
36
could advance some or all of the dimensions set forth above.
Thompson was right. Modern computing techniques have now
reached such high degrees of storage density and speeds in such
compact spaces that large scale communications systems can be
built that will efficiently and reliably display the characteristics of a
commonly accessible information base, a common area for communicants, and consensus development. The Bar-Hillel Conundrum
has been solved by raw computer power based on microcircuit
design.
To the degree that public policy encourages computer techniques to be used to enhance these three communications dimensions broadscale throughout our economy, our society, if Thompson
is correct, will experience a direct and long-range rise in wealth. To
the extent that this new wealth is based upon such advanced communications dimensions, we will see a true "information economy"
develop.
B.

ROBOTICS

The fusion of machine tools and microchip technology, plus eco34. Id.

35. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 506.
36. Id.
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nomic realities, has made the science fiction speculation regarding
robots a reality. Robots are intended to bring increased efficiency at
lower production costs, and they usually do. For example, it has
been said that arc-welding on shipbuilding achieves about a 20% efficiency rate when done by humans based on when the arc is actually on and metal is being welded, as compared to a 70% efficiency
when robot controlled. 37 This increased efficiency will pay for an expensive arc-welding robot in approximately one year. Pioneer Electronics Corp., the Japanese consumer electronics firm, reports that
through robot automation it has reduced the cost of installing elec-

tronic components by 75%.38 Panasonic reports that its defect rate
is now one-fiftieth of what it was before robotization, and Nissan
Motor Co. predicts that 90% of its production will ultimately be
39
robotized.
The forerunner of today's robots are all the automatic machines
associated with mass production-from Jacquard's 18th Century
programmable loom to the modern automatic cannery. In the 1970's,
numerically controlled tool making machinery like heavy metalworking equipment that could consistently shape and cut intricate
metal designs based upon a preprogrammed sequence, was introduced. By the late 1970's, metal working, lifting and turning devices
on assembly lines were being equipped with spray guns and welders to fabricate more completely finished products. These devices,
while more versatile than their predecessors, are still tied to the
particular assembly line they were associated with. They also remain expensive, usually costing more than $100,000 each.
Within the last three years however, a subsidiary of Hitachi
Computer in Japan has produced an inexpensive and reliable production robot that is not tied to a particular assembly line operation.
Funac Ltd., it is reported, is now marketing a generally-programmable device that can lift metal, turn, cut, shape, paint, and polish it.
Motion is controlled by a true digital computer. In addition, Funac
has two models that can store the shapes of 6000 different components and their positions in a finished product.4°
These robots are currently priced at approximately $20,000 each.
This means that the device is well within the purchasing power of
the small American tool and die companies that do most of the
metal working in this country. The devices are specifically devel37. Cook, Robots Lead a New IndustrialRevolution In Japan, L.A. Times, Dec. 30,
1981, Part IV, at B.
38. Id.
39. Covine, The Robots Are Coming, L.A. Times, Jan. 18, 1982, Part II, at 11.
40. Weigner, The Dawn of Battle, 128 FORBES, Oct. 26, 1981, at 77.
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oped for small and medium-sized factories that need to compete
through cheap labor, such as small-parts suppliers to the American
automobile industry. The entire Funac output thus far has been absorbed by the domestic Japanese market, but Funac plans to begin
exporting these robots to the United States in the near future.
These developments have made Funac's stock the hottest item on
the Japanese stock exchange with average yearly profit increases of
82% 41
Twenty years ago a typical piece of automatic equipment
designed to replace labor on the assembly line cost about $4.20 per
hour averaged over the life of the equipment, a figure somewhat
higher than a human worker's wages and benefits. In 1982, a highly
versatile robot can still be operated for approximately $5 an hour,
averaged over the life of the equipment, while the cost of a human
worker has risen to between $15 and $20 an hour. 42 The Funac development and high labor costs have led the American Society of
Manufacturing Engineers and the University of Michigan to predict
that by 1988, 50% of the labor in all small-component assembly, tra43
ditionally the hardest to automate, will be replaced by automation.
Entrepreneurs are striving to capitalize on these production efficiencies and cost disparities. One reporter states that the "Japanese
are deadly serious about doing in robots what it has done in consumer electronics, cars, steel and shipbuilding." 44 The present market for robots is reported to be $150 million in annual sales, and it is
predicted that by 1990 the market will have risen to $2.1 billion.
These figures indicate a tremendous expansion over the next decade
is in the offing for the use of computerized automation where
humans once worked. The startling scene of Funac's present manufacturing plants may thus one day be common. Operating with only
100 workers, 20% of the number normally needed for similarly sized
plants, the Funac plants continue to run throughout the night in total darkness, the last person out having extinguished what is needed
45
only by frail humans: the electric lights.
V. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INFORMATION ECONOMY
Thompson described a kind of Heisenberg principle that operates in communications. Just as the location of communications
41.
42.
Edson,
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Dodd, Robots: The New Steel Collar Workers, 60 PERSONNEL J. 688-95 (1981);
Slaves of Industry, 18 ACROSS THE BOARD 5-11 (1981).
Id.
See Weigner, supra note 40.
Id.
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centers, such as post offices and telephone exchanges, affects subsequent urban development, and thus site selection for these facilities
involves not only predicting fertility rates, population growth rates
and patterns, but also the net effect of the introduction of the facilities themselves into the community, so the kinds of communications
services devised will influence the types of transactions people can
and will engage in. Thompson argued that while the wrong location
of a post office or telephone exchange is not terribly serious, if "the
communications services that we as a society develop turn out to be
wrong, the results could be disastrous."''
Thompson speculated about some of these disastrous results.
He described present day television as a type of electronic tabloid
service. Although it exhibits some of the characteristics of a communications system that provides a common information base, it exhibits characteristics the opposite of a consensus building system to
a more significant degree. He argued that:
In the case of mass media, the only kinds of messages that can win
overwhelming support, when they are fed over a broad distribution
network, are the kinds of messages that relate to negative feedback.
Ban the bomb. Stop the war. Large groups of people can more
readily form consensus about things they dislike than things they
like. Hence mass media tend to 47build consensus that pertain to
negative feedback kinds of things.
Thus the creation of huge electronic media networks that compete
with each other through a type of electronic "yellow journalism"
may be a "disaster" that inherently leads to greater schism and factionalism in our society.
It is true, of course, that over the last twenty years that television has permeated our society, factionalism, or "one-issue politics",
has become a strong force in our national affairs. Such politics rely
heavily upon the electronic broadcast media. It is also instructive to
note that other countries, such as England and France, have often
controlled the electronic media with an eye towards controlling the
growth of these very moments. 8 In this country, First Amendment
considerations bar direct regulation of electronic information. The
encouragement of other forms of electronic communication, such as
view data, cable television and videodisk, may have ameliorating effect upon this factionalizing tendency of the electronic media by
competing with the electronic broadcast media.
An example of what Thompson would regard as a policy of wasting time and resources in our nascent information economy is an at46. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 504.
47. Id. at 505.
48. Id.
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tempt to build a video telephone system-a system of two-way
visual communications. Science fiction to the contrary, he does not
think such systems will ever be popular. "Picturephone does not
have a shared visual space. Consider a game of naughts and crosses
(tic-tac-toel played on Picturephone, and you will see how this visual space is not shared. The naughts are shown on the screen while
front of you. At no time do
the crosses are on a piece of paper in
'49
these two images get superimposed.
Such a system has not in fact proved to be especially popular
because it does not provide a significant improvement in any of the
three communications dimensions discussed above. 50 In fact, plain
ordinary telephone service may continue to attract users over systems like video telephone because it does involve shared space.
Long-term economies of efficiency may require that we not waste
time and resources playing with systems like video telephones but
rather put our resources into systems like Scribblephone. Thompson has noted that "[c]ontinued satisfaction with trivial improvethe wider community
ments in the communications environment for '51
may turn out to be a luxury we cannot afford.
The fusion of computing and telecommunications and the invention of smart machine tools may raise greater problems for society
than was apparent ten years ago when Thompson was developing
the ideas outlined above. Certainly the possibility of computer-assisted design and industrial production was not taken as seriously
then as it is now. The industrial economy was not built without
grievious and widespread hardships such as child labor, sweatshops,
hazards in the workplace, and job discrimination that took fifty
years of social legislation to correct. The post-industrial information
economy may likewise have its grievious excesses, although the excitement of home computerized gadgetry, office word processing
systems, and robotized assembly lines may for a time obscure them.
It is precisely to those potential problems that public policy thinkers
should be directing their attention. We now turn to a consideration
of what some of these problem areas might be.
49. Id. at 505.
50. Johansen, Social Evaluations of Teleconferences, TELECOM. POL'Y 395 (1977).
See also Pye & Williams, Teleconferencing: Is Video Valuable or Is Audio Adequate?,
TELECOM. POL'y 230-41 (1977).
51. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 507.
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IS WIDESPREAD

DISTRIBUTION OF SOPHISTICATED INFORMATION IN THE

PUBLIC GOOD?
Although the American press has always functioned in a largely
laissez faire environment, the electronic media have always been
regulated. Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology points out that the first telecommunications device, the telegraph, set the pattern. It was legally regarded as an
instrument of commerce and regulated like the railroads. Telegraphs were not regarded as unregulable instruments of information
like news presses. This was true even though newspapers were
quick to use telegraphy to bring in distant news. In fact, the Associated Press and Reuters Wire Services were formed within a decade
after the invention of the telegraph just for this purpose.
Later telecommunications devices were considered to be in the
mold of the telegraph rather than not the printing press. In 1912, the
Navy used radio for maritime communication and persuaded Congress to require the licensing of all other transmitters. Twenty-two
years later, Congress adopted a regulatory scheme for all wire and
broadcast communication by enacting the Federal Communications
Act of 1934.
Today, the FCC is deregulating much electronic communication,
but the rationale and tradition of regulation remain. When the FCC
completed its second "Computer Inquiry" to distinguish computing,
which is not regulated (IBM), from electronic communication which
is (AT&T), its solution was widely criticized because computing and
communications today are virtually synonymous. Whether it be
mathematical quantities, hotel or airline reservations, news, or telephone voices traveling across country in digitalized form, these cannot be distinguished except on the basis of their substance. As
education and publishing continue to move to electronic modes, the
existence of this electronic legal tradition of regulation should concern policy makers, as should its basic rationale that "computing"
may not be regulated, but that "communication" may. The First
Amendment, after all, has it the other way around.
Constitutional theories aside, perhaps as a practical matter, regulation of widespread electronic "compunications" is necessary.
The broadscale transmission of high-grade, specific and individualized intelligence throughout society could mean very rapid and uncontrolled social change. When Gutenberg published the Bible, he
ended centuries of the Scripture's general unavailability. Europeans were no longer dependent upon the church bishops for doctrinal
instruction, but could read the Bibles for themselves and form their
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own opinions. Within decades, the Protestant Revolution was in full
swing as The Word became the focal point of faith and not the sacraments or the priests.
Modern universities, governments, companies, and other established organizations may not fare any better than the medieval
church did. The task of controlling society's general access to important information may become impossible with the advent of networks that are programmed as "knowledge retrieval systems" rather
than mere data retrieval systems. If one is able, in the privacy of his
own home, to access highly sophisticated sources of information
programmed to formulate answers to inquiries in the context of specific situations, why should one go to other authorities, especially if
the electronic source challenges those authorities?
One may speculate about where this process will stop. Governments may worry about whether all the secrets of governance will
be made available to the public at large. Citizens too may have
grave concern about the detail and quality of information provided.
For example, query whether specific information will be available on
how to cook lunch, on how to prepare gourmet dinners, on how to
prepare undetectable poisons, on how to build a toy, on how to build
a radio, or on how to build a bomb. And query what the effect on
society will be when everyone is able to feed his or her own
prejudices without the intellectual restraint of trained teachers. We
already had a taste of the sorts of policy issues involved in this area
when the National Security Agency recently threatened universitybased computer scientists who did not submit to a prepublication
review of research papers involving so-called mathematically un52
breakable codes.
Sound public policy in light of such developments as the home
computer and national networking to extremely large information
bases is still speculative. If the change brought about by the printing press is any indication, however, then the 1977 conclusion of the
French Government's Nora Report is quite correct-serious and fundamental changes are indeed what the future holds for our society
as computerization brings high-grade, specific information to the privacy of individuals' homes.
B.

THE NEW PRIVACY: REGULATION OF INFORMATION IN AN
INFORMATION-DEPENDENT SOCIETY

The rise of a society where computerized recordkeeping and
transference of information about individuals are very cheap and
52. Inman, Classifying Science: A Government Proposal, 116 AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH. Feb. 8, 1982, at 10. See also Carey, And a Scientist's Objection, id.
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easy to accomplish has given rise to a concommitant interest in protecting individual information privacy. There is little doubt, as the
Privacy Protection Study Commission concluded, that the law is
now inadequate to protect individual privacy from "databank" invasion. For example, modern information gathering and retrieval techniques enable organizations to build up not only files, but mosaics
of, persons' characteristics, derived from records of purchases, relocations, tax information, and so on. As they become more complete,
these mosaics have a greater predictive utility. This means that a
computerized file of a person and a program to interpret that fle
may make its possessor quite influential over the lives of the persons on fie in the databank.
A legal framework to regulate the collection and use of computerized information, usually referred to as "computer privacy," seems
to be under formation, primarily at the state level. This regulatory
framework, however, has substantial side effects.
American state governments have been the most active in the
world in efforts to consider computer privacy legislation. At least
one state, California, has elevated the right to privacy to constitutional status expressly in response to the advent of popular computerization. Several other states have enacted complex and
comprehensive "fair information practices" laws.
Most state fair information practices laws are derived from principles set forth in a 1973 report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare entitled Records, Computers and the Rights of
Citizens. Thus far, these enactments have regulated only state
agency use of personal information. The pattern of these state laws,
however, was only actively under consideration by state govern53
ments for extension into the private sector.
One critique of these laws is that they are not actually privacy
laws. Rather, they establish elaborate information processing restrictions which are relied upon to preserve privacy by implication.
These restrictions apply directly to collection, maintenance, internal
use, and dissemination of personal information. They are drafted
with computerized recordkeeping in mind, but often are generalized
to cover file-cabinet recordkeeping as well. This is where the cost of
doing business begins to escalate.
A constitutional critique of these measures is that they are
based upon a public policy that considers it appropriate to engage in
content regulation of information. The concern is that this policy,
initially expressed in such regulatory acts as the Federal Communications Act of 1934, will be maintained and strengthened as publish53. CouNcIL

OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,

1978

SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION

43.
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ing, as well as motion pictorial modes of communication, are
digitalized and increasingly used throughout society. We thus almost imperceptibly have a growing acceptance of the regulatory philosophy as applied to electronic communication in an area that has
heretofore been a laissez faire sphere under the First Amendment.
Computer privacy is a part and parcel of this attitude, which
seeks to impose prior restraint upon usage of "personal" information. "The problem," according to Dr. Pool, "stems from a failure of
the law to reflect how electronics is taking over the technology of
communication." 54 Floyd Abrams, a commentator in the New York
Times, concludes that the growth of privacy law is "the single most
ominous threat to the First Amendment's guarantee of press
55
freedom."
A philosophical critique of these "information practices" statutes involves their basic regulatory perspective. Dr. Joseph Weizenbaum of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology provides a
key to understanding where the mind set of information practices
legislation comes from. Weizenbaum argued that machines often
subtly influence us by giving rise to a common metaphorical view of
their meaning. Sometimes a very complex idea enters the public
consciousness in a form so highly simplified that it is little more
than a caricature of the original. Yet, such a sketch of the original
idea may dramatically alter a public conception of reality. For example, Einstein's theory of relativity has come to justify in the popular mind a sort of relativism in cultural values which is not at all
56
what Einstein was conceptualizing.
As with Einstein's theory of relativity, the public embrace of
computer systems rests only upon the vaguest understanding of the
theory of computability; that is, of Turing's experiments concerning
the universality of certain computing schemes. Nevertheless, Weizenbaum argued, the popular mind has become firmly convinced
that everything is at least potentially understandable in terms of
computer models and metaphors. The result is that most everything
has come to be viewed as being merely another type of data
57
processing system.
This view extends to human beings, too. For example, there exists now, in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature an index
54. Pool, From Gutenberg to Electronics: Implicationsfor the FirstAmendment, 43
THE KEY REP. 2 (1978).

55. Abrams, The Press, Privacy and the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 21,
1977, at 11.
56. See J. WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT
TO CALCULATION (1976).

57. Id.
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category entitled "Human Information Processing." This category
lists articles that discuss human beings as if they were types of computer systems. The listings indicate that many authors now approach the topic of human activity as if each human being were
merely another type of "turn-key" data processing system. If individuals are viewed as being only another type of automatic computing system, then it is only a slight extension to viewing aggregates of
people, that is, organizations, as being also only another type of information processing system.
Information practices legislation represents the product of this
mind set, where the individuals in the organization to be regulated
is regarded as parts of a large machine-like process amenable to
programming by a legislature. Under the information practices concept, executives, managers, and members of organizations are regarded as parts of great, low internal speed data processing systems
that may be programmed by laws that enact narrow sets of formalized information transference rules. Under these laws, the scope of
executive, managerial, or clerical action in the context of personal
information transactions is formally programmed as if the decision
maker were a "yes-no" logic circuit, not a human being who in facts
makes continuous and variable judgments, judgments not only
about the nature of the information before the person, but the context in which it arose and is to be applied. It is this "programmatic"
perspective that causes many of the difficulties with fair information
practices legislation.
For one, these statutes are known for their overbreadth. Restrictions are often simplistically drafted to apply to literally all
types of personal information transactions. This enormous breadth
of regulation is a natural outcome of a view that all persons and organizations are merely variant varieties of the genus "information
processor," that similar information transference restrictions will be
operable in all informational contexts. Of course, in real life with its
immense diversity, complexity, and requirements for personal information, this perspective breaks down almost immediately. This explains in part why, when such laws are enacted, a strong push
develops to create "exceptions" either by administrative practice or
judicial rule to the requirements of the fair information practices
statutes.
A second limitation of the "information practices" model derives
from the view that organized personal information flow is a "computable" phenomenon, a phenomenon programmable by detailed
legislation. This perspective overlooks the fact that human informational activities are rarely static; they are in fact themselves responding to a changing environment by continuously evolving.

1983]

AN INFORMATION ECONOMY

In the internal environment of an electronic computer, the imposition of rigid and formalized protocols is crucial to accurate information processing. Extending this idea to complex and evolving
human informational activities that are designed to deal with a fluid
and changing exterior environment once again explains why practical "loopholes" are almost immediately required once a "fair information practices" statute is enacted.
Finally, the essential nature of reliable computerized information processing is that the computer must be programmed to operate repeatedly and accurately within established boundaries. The
essential nature of reliable organizational activity, however, requires
that an organization's members function flexibly, like a team, with
different ad hoc reactions to various and unexpected external
stimuli.
According to William Reif of the University of Iowa Bureau of
Business and Economic Research, good management structures
have deep informal channels of communication that overwhelmingly
carry the greatest burden of informational traffic. Extending the
"fair information practices" idea to organizations tends to significantly undercut the informal informational channels upon which
most organizations depend for operational flexibility and efficiency.
The impulse to legislate to protect privacy is quite strong. However, the fair information practices approach, if pushed too far, may
create a legal structure that is not only inefficient but also ineffective. It may even prove to be repugnant to First Amendment concepts. Moreover, it is founded upon the obnoxious concept that
people are automatons. Yet to date very little top level thinking has
been done to develop a legal structure that will protect a common
idea of privacy while at the same time preserving judgmental and
organizational flexibility.
C.

THE MYSTIQUE OF COMPUTING AND THE ART OF THINKING

In 1981, a computer specialist observed that with the fusion of
computers and telecommunications, "man is beginning a new development cycle-that of extending and magnifying his intellect."
Computer experts at Stanford University foresee the day when artificially intelligent networks will be programmed not only to give private users appropriate background information, but will give
reasoned analyses based on expert knowledge of problems posed,
the so-called "smart" data networks using the techniques of "artificial intelligence." At least one commentator goes so far as to predict
that, by 1995, computer systems will equal humans in intellectual ca-
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pacity. 58 Indeed, if the Japanese Fifth Generation Project lives up to
some expectations, computer systems with human-like intelligence
will be utilized by the end of this decade. It thus appears we may
not only be moving towards an age of information retrieval systems,
but also towards an era of "knowledge" retrieval systems, where
data networks will not only communicate, but will "intellectually"
manipulate information.
The effect of such systems could be startling when used broadscale throughout society. Computer programs are, after all, basically logical systems based upon mathematics. Even if a particular
program is not a mathematical algorithm, it is expressed in mathematical symbology and their electronic equivalents. Moreover,
programmatic modes have been designed by professionals steeped
in mathematical analysis, a problem solving technique that disapproves of nonverbal thought processes and exhalts structured logic.
This design affects the kind of problem solving that computer systems are inherently oriented to; computers perform best when doing
structured analysis of hard factual data. If information can be translated into numbers, it becomes "computable." This explains why
computer systems were first successfully applied to problems in accounting and statistical manipulation and still are not easily applied
to management information processing.
There are those who now seriously suspect that mathematical
modes of analysis are the weakest, not the strongest approach to
high level decision making which must successfully face diverse and
unexpected outside demands and unclear factual situations. Recent
management studies indicate that an ability to synthesize information and to work with "irrational" and "incomplete" information is
crucial for effective top management. Logical analysis skills are best
used in middle management positions and are counterproductive at
59
top levels.
Eugene S. Ferguson, Professor of History at the University of
Delaware and Curator of Technology at Hagley Museum, concludes
that much of the malfunctioning of systems and gadgets today is a
product of the inherent weakness of a philosophy which stresses rationalistic numerical analysis to the exclusion of nonverbal
thought.60 "Because perceptive processes are not assumed to entail
58. Jastrow, Our Brain's Successor, Sci. DIG., March 1981, at 58. See also Jastrow,
Post-Human Intelligence, 86 NAT. HIST., June-July 1977, at 12; Jastrow, The PostHuman World, Sci. DIG., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 88.
59. Mintzberg, Planning on the Left Side and Managing on the Right, 54 HARV.
Bus. REV. 49 (1976).
60. Ferguson, The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in Technology, 97 SCIENCE,
Aug. 26, 1977, at 827.

19831

AN INFORMATION ECONOMY

hard thinking," Ferguson argues, "it has been customary to consider
nonverbal thought among the more primitive stages in the development of cognitive processes and inferior to verbal or mathematical
thought."'6 1 The hierarchy of thought may actually be the other way
around. The generally disparaged ability to think holistically and intuitively rather than sequentially and logically may characterize the
highest levels of thinking ability. The absurd random failures that
have plagued automatic control systems, such as those that once bedeviled San Francisco's BART Subway System, are not mere trivial
aberrations. "They are a reflection of the chaos that results when
'6 2
design is assumed to be a problem in mathematics.
Ferguson's concerns may touch only the tip of the iceberg.
Political observer David Halberstam has written that the consequences of the Viet Nam War were severe for America in part because Secretary of Defense McNamara considered only information
that could be put into a computer, information such as numbers and
statistics and body counts, to the exclusion of firsthand observation
and intuitive analysis by seasoned Southeast Asia hands. Halberstram writes:
He was always looking for his own criteria. Reporters would remember McNamara in 1965 going to I Corps in Da Nang. ..

. A

Marine colonel had a sand table showing the terrain and was patiently giving the briefing. McNamara was not really taking it in; his
hands were folded and he was frowning a little. Finally he interrupted: Now, let me see, if I have it right, this is your situation: And
then it came out from him-all numbers and statistics, this many
friendlies on this many operations, this many troops to attack 48%
of them after dark. The colonel was very bright and read him immediately, like a man breaking a code. Without changing stride, he
went on with the briefing, simply switching its terms. Out it came,
all quantified, with percentages and indicies. McNamara was fascinated now. The colonel's performance was so blatent it was like a
satire, and one of the reporters began to laugh and had to leave the
tent. Later that day the newsman went up to McNamara and commented on how tough the situation was up there, but McNamara
wasn't interested in Viet Cong, he wanted to talk about the colonel:
"That colonel is one of the finest officers I've ever met," he said.
But if he gleefully accepted information in this form, he resisted
those who tried to question it. Stuart Alsop has told the story of
Desmond FitzGerald, the high-ranking CIA officer who used to brief
McNamara, warning that in his opinion the statistics were all meaningless, that the U.S. was in for a rougher time than they indicated.
McNamara asked him why, and he answered, "it was an instinct, a
61. Id.
62. Id.
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feeling;" the CIA man received an incredulous stare and was never
asked to brief the Secretary again. And there were other stories: In
1963, when Viet Nam began deteriorating at a faster rate, a White
House assistant would argue with him and finally McNamara would
snap back and say, "You're talking well, but where are your facts?
You state these things so glibly, you say the government has lost
popularity recently. How much? What percentage did it have, and
what percentage does it have now? Where is your data? Give me
something I can put in the computer. Don't give me your poetry."
The civilian would answer that his information was based on
firsthand knowledge and distrust of the kind of reporting McNamara was getting. But McNamara believed this reporting, and he
did not believe that civilians could know as much as the military
about war, about battles, and so when the civilian mentioned his
sources, McNamara scoffed. This was, he said, "a prejudiced data
base. All you do is go around and find someone who's against this
thing and then you listen to him. That's your data base."
And so in these crucial middle years McNamara attached his name
and reputation to the possibility and hopes for victory, caught himself more deeply on the morace of Viet Nam, and limited himself
greatly in his future actions.
It is not a particularly happy chapter in his life. He did not serve
was, and there is, no kinder or
himself nor the country well; 6 he
3
more gentle word for it, a fool.
Because of McNamara's belief in numerical analysis techniques,
and not in "poetry," he seriously misjudged the possibilities for victory in the Viet Nam War.
Unless serious and sustained attention is directed to the effect
which the inherent design structure of computer systems has upon
users, widespread societal use of computers in the home and
through networking may inperceptively develop a culture locked
into symbiotic relation with its systems where it will be hard to distinguish the information processes of the computers from the thinking of the users-a nation, in short, of Mr. Spocks.
In science fiction, such wholly logical creatures usually are
deemed highly successful at dealing with strange and unexpected
demands. In real life, where real wars are fought, it is doubtful they
are, or ever could be. Dealing with this trend could give renewed
meaning and urgency to humanities education. To paraphase Marshall McLuhan, is not the essence of education civil defense against
64
the fall-out of computerization?
63. Halberstam, The Programming of Robert McNamara,
1971, at 37, 61-62.
64. M. McLuHAN, THE
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D.

COMPUNICATIONS AND GOVERNMENT

Joseph Weizenbaum points out that the form of many organizations in the public sector today could not exist without computer
systems. Under the pressure of population growth, as well as international and economic change, the administration of many programs
might have evolved from the centralized bureau to other forms. For
example, had computer systems not made possible the administration of social programs on a continental scale, perhaps such ideas as
the negative income tax might have been implemented to replace
present welfare programs, and decentralized, perhaps highly localized organizations might have been established for what is now the
65
Department of Health and Welfare.
By preserving existing public organizations, one perpetuates
their philosophical rationales even though those rationales might
have become questionable. According to Weizenbaum, "[t]he very
erection of an enormous and complex computer-based welfare administration apparatus created an interest in its maintenance and
therefore in the perpetuation of the welfare system itself. And such
interests soon become substantial barriers to innovation even if
'66
good reasons to innovate later accumulate.
Indications that Weizenbaum's perceptions are accurate also exist at the state government level where computing has had a strong
centralizing effect. Most state programs have, by virtue of computerization, been centralized in capital city bureaus such as departments of motor vehicles, social services, education, and more
recently, the administration of justice. This is indicated by, among
other things, the adoption by state governments of regulatory
frameworks for specific applications of computing to major policy areas. Thirty-five states now have frameworks establishing electronic
voting systems. Twenty-three states authorize police criminal information tracking systems. Sixteen states have established electronic
judicial information processing systems. Seven states have computerized legislative information processing systems.
The overwhelmingly dominant policy of state government with
respect to computing itself has been to centralize control over the
acquisition and use of computer systems, which is to say over the
policies and programs administered by those systems. 67 The paradigm approach in this area is that of the State of Mississippi, which
has established a central governmental data processing authority
65. See J. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 56, at 30-31.

66. Id. at 31.
67. Lautsch, Digest and Analysis of State Legislation Affecting Computing, 20
JURIMETRICS J. 201 (Spring 1980).
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with power to administer all computerized services provided by the
68
state government.
Although predicated on an idea of efficiency, these statutory
frameworks centralize and perpetuate the structures of the policy
areas they affect. By virtue of focusing budgetary attention on their
areas, these frameworks also increase the influence of the computerized areas viz 6 viz the noncomputerized policy areas of government. Some states are now advocating centralization and
consolidation of executive agencies and programs to centralization
into one organization of all authority over the data processing needs
and plans for all branches of government. 69 Such a policy exhalts
computerized efficiency over the separation of powers which underlies the forms of state government in the United States. A standard
response of computer specialists to questions about this is that
there is no cause for concern; a centralized data processing facility
is merely a neutral, efficient recordkeeping service with no decisionmaking power over the functions of the separate governmental
branches. In every reported instance of a judicial contest where this
question has been raised, however, the courts have concluded that
centralizing information processing is the same as unifying significant governmental power.
The most direct opinion on point was rendered by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Reviewing a proposed statute that would
have established a state electronic data processing and telecommunications commission with authority over all three branches of the
state government, the Court concluded the potential for dangerous
and genuine concentration of indirect control over all three
branches of government was inherent in the proposed law and
noted:
The manner in which data are collected and stored in a carefully
programmed computer has major implications for the manner in
which they can be later used. Control over the collection, processing and dissemination of data is thus, at least indirect control over
the information process and the activities of personnel engaged in
its collection and use. This fact belies the assurance
of the bill as to
70
control and regulation of the source agency.
The proposed legislation was in the opinion of the Justices therefore
directly contrary to the Massachusetts' constitutional requirement
of separation of powers.
The impact of computerization on local governments is inher68. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-53-1 to 25-53-59 (1976).

69. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.21.150-.170 (1977) and ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41710, 41-711 to 41-718 (1980).
70. 365 Mass. 639, 646, 309 N.E.2d 476, 481 (1974).
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ently undemocratic in the opinion of a study by the Public Policy
Research Organization of the University of California, Irvine, released in the fall of 1981. 7 The impact of computing is to reinforce a
city's dominant political coalition and to exclude other legitimate interests. According to news reports of the study, "there is mounting
evidence that systems implementation has made municipal agencies
more costly to run, less responsive to the public and less equitable
in meeting the needs of particular population groups. ' 72
It is unclear if this same conservative effect is operating on organizations in the private sector, although there seems to be little reason it should not, especially in large organizations. Nevertheless,
the noted commentator John Diebold predicts that corporate application of computers will by the mid-1980's create:
...a totally new kind of business structure centered on information processing in which internal and external data interact with
each other in countless variations.
The information system will then be the heart of the structure. All
levels of management will be involved in one or another information processing activity. Companies will be information service centers whose highly automated plan will be making this or that
73
service-all dependent on a total corporate planning system.
This prediction will not come to pass if computerization in the
private sector operates as it apparently does the public sector, that
is, if the computer system becomes the tool of groups who derive
their influence by virtue of the organization's present computerized
structure. Public policy studies and management information systems analysis may one day provide organization principles that will
avoid these shortcomings in both the public and private arenas.
E.

ROBOTS AND EMPLOYMENT

Much attention has recently been given to automation of manufacturing processes and the use of robots to fabricate goods or to
provide services. This process is likely to give rise to serious and
immediate social problems. A business risk analyst with Business
Environment Risk Index, a Maryland firm, has predicted urban riots
in summer 1983 because unemployment rates among the black underclass will remain high in part due to the robotization of traditionally labor-intensive industries.
71. Schultz, City DP Seen Eroding Democracy, Computerworld, March 30, 1981, at
1; Schultz, Urbis Discovers Success of Government DP Depends on "Computing Milieu" of U.S. Cities, Computerworld, April 6, 1981, at 12.
72. Id.
73. Diebold, Bad Decisions on Computer Use, 47 HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1969,
at 14.
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A letter to the Los Angeles Times framed the basic issues raised
by robotization:
Recently I've heard many supply-side economists suggest that millions of jobs in industry will be created as the factories rebuild and
retool over the next decade. While this "reindustrialization" may
create a short-run demand for workers, long-run prospects look
rather clouded at best.
As an industrial engineer who is deeply involved in this retooling
effort, I feel these economists are grossly ignorant of the new American corporate philosophy which, in short, directs companies to hire
more machines and less people.
In a recent trade magazine article, one analyst predicted that in ten
years the U.S. auto industry may be producing at twice today's
levels with only 80% of today's work force due to advances in robotics, computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), and computer-aided design (CAD). I recently read that a Japanese factory has a robot
which operates eight numerically controlled (computerized) lathes.
The robot and lathes require full-time service from a mechanic,
programmer, and a set-up person. Thus, eight skilled lathehands
have been replaced by three super-skilled technicians, a net deletion of five jobs.
I believe this new thrust was clearly, if crudely, exemplified by an
advertisement which crossed my desk. It boldly recommended to
"Replace that redneck with a robot!" It noted that, unlike "rednecks," robots will work 24 hours a day, never join unions, never
take extended coffee breaks, and the like.
Of course, with advances in the areas of CAD and CAM, many
white collar workers could become extinct too. Some say displaced
workers will find jobs in the "service sector." Doing what? Won't
many of those jobs be handled by robots74 too? Who knows, maybe
robots will replace economists someday.
Policy planners should take a long view of the social implications of
"robotization," including our society's survivability, before it becomes a general feature of our economy. Trained workers, such as
at an automobile assembly plant, represent a resource which will be
dispersed if skilled jobs on an assembly line are given over to machines. While automation may provide for greater production economies in the short run, it is legitimate to question the wisdom of
allowing our labor skills to be dispersed by robots. To be crude but
perhaps altogether too realistic, we may discover, for instance, that
it is difficult to convert automated plants from the manufacture of
cars to the manufacture of tanks. On the other hand, it is not difficult to divert skilled auto workers to such wartime tasks, should it
ever become essential.
74. L.A. Times, June 14, 1981, Part VI, at 3.
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Counterbalancing these long-range concerns is the country's
survivability in the world marketplace. If countries such as Japan
automate and achieve the increased efficiencies and lower production costs noted earlier, the ability of American companies to compete internationally may be seriously undermined. The American
economy has had serious difficulties producing enough jobs for the
unemployed for a number of years. It seems rather obvious, in the
words of one observer, "that the absorption of 'steel collar' workers
into the American economic system poses a human problem of for75
midable proportions.
Businessmen argue, however, that by making the United States
more competitive in world markets, automation will produce more
jobs than it eliminates. One commentator even argues that robots
will "save democracy. ' 76 Furthermore, it is argued, they will improve working conditions and the standard of living of most workers.
A senior research associate at SRI International is reported to have
concluded that:
Increasing the level of industrial technology can only be good for
the labor market in the long run. If you look back 200 years, about
80% of the population worked very hard laboring on their own farm,
just so they could afford to eat. Today less than 4% of Americans
are in that category. Due to modern technology, today's farmer can
plow a 40 foot wide strip of land, and the only thing he7 7has to worry
about is falling asleep in his air-conditioned machine.
If we one day achieve a level of robotization that permits, say, 20%
of the population to produce all manufactured goods, one can only
wonder what activities will keep the remaining 80% earning incomes. The 4% farming population discussed by SRI works, after
all, in a highly subsidized sector of our economy.
Perhaps the "Age of the Employee," when virtually everyone is
an employee, is passing and will be replaced in the future by a population that looks for sustenance to their own self-employment in
cottage industries. Perhaps even new labor-intensive industries will
78
arise, based upon inexpensive computer terminals linking homes.
All this, however, is highly speculative. Whatever the eventual
outcome, it is clear that to avoid the type of society envisioned by
Kurt Vonnegut in The Piano Player, where everyone was "employed" in the Army or in a civilian Reconstruction and Reclamation
Corps, the primary task for policy planners and government regula75.
76.
77.
78.

See Covine, supra note 39.
Moore, Will Robots Save Democracy?, 15 FUTURIST, Aug. 1981, at 14-19.
See Dodd, supra note 42.
Williams, The New Technologies, 18 AcRoss THE BOARD, July-Aug. 1981, at 11-
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tors will be to regulate the transition from human employment to
automation, for it is clear that robots are coming. The increased efficiency and lower production costs, plus the availability of the technology, literally require it.
Perhaps trade unions can work a positive benefit upon our coming "post-industrial" society by recognizing the issues in this area
and forcefully bargaining now for certain employment rights suggested some years ago by the International Asssociation of Machinists. With respect to automation, in September 1968, the LAM
recommended to its locals that they bargain for (1) advance notice
and consultation when major changes because of automation were
contemplated; (2) the right to transfer to other jobs with adequate
moving allowances; (3) training for the new jobs at full pay; (4) reservation of the previous rate of pay for downgraded workers;
(5) provision for early retirement with pension; (6) continuation of
fringe benefits during layoff; (7) negotiation of new rates of pay
when automation increases skill requirements or work demands;
and (8) fair distribution of automation's productivity through increased wages, more leisure time and greater job security. 79 If computerization is to be used throughout the manufacturing sector of
our economy, spreading the benefits of automation through the labor ranks may not only help to preserve some of those ranks, but to
preserve the social and productive fabric that depends upon those
ranks as well.
Another problem with automation involves the dramatic change
in organizational relationships that occurs once automation is introduced. The computer operators and programmers that operate the
automatic machines, such as the mechanic, programmer, and set-up
person noted in the Los Angeles Times letter quoted above, come to
occupy strategic positions in the organization. Therefore, their employment benefit aspirations become crucial to successful
operations.
One commentator forecasts what he calls "Electronic Luddites"
changing the nature of labor-management relations by an awareness
of the organization's dependence upon the computer system. It is
reported that a British management consultant "sees the threat of
trade unions and industrial conflict as the most sinister to computerized society. We may be at the end of the old-fashioned, recognized
strikes as we know them. . . . When we had a big coal and power
strike here sometime ago, the miners rushed the power stations.
How long will it be, when the whole power system is on a national
79. Joy, Labor Relations, 1 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 2-4, ar'. 1.
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grid, before they just take over the computer?"80
Another interesting and perhaps alarming use of computers in
labor relations was made by Adelphi University on Long Island. By
mutual agreement with the campus chapter of the American Association of University Professors, data on work force composition, age,
academic qualifications, fringe benefits, seniority, and the impact of
benefits on wages were supplied to a computer. The computer was
programmed to formulate all the variables into packages for consideration at the bargaining table. The idea was to test whether agreement on information could help promote resolution of conflicts in
collective bargaining. The American Arbitration Association, which
funded the project, reported it was very successful. 81
One may speculate how the Association knew its project was
successful. Again and again computer experts inform us that computer fraud is the rule, not the exception. Manipulation of computer
systems we are told is possible to anyone possessing a pair of
wireclips and a touchtone telephone. Computer fraud requires
about as much education and expertise as a typical scientifically inclined high school student might possess and appears to offer an excellent reward/risk ratio. 82 If this is true, one questions the wisdom
of turning over important social and political processes, such as collective bargaining, to the information processing capabilities of a
master computer, at least not without guaranteeing that the computer is tamper proof and that it is programmed to run accurately.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The impact of computerization upon us all will depend upon the
multitude of decisions made by technicians, engineers, corporate
managers, trade union representatives, and ordinary citizens
throughout our society. Much long-range decision-making, however,
can only come from society organized as a government. To make
correct decisions, government must have an understanding of the
constraints and possibilities of the technology. Significant new
wealth could well be created on a widescale by the correct application of "compunications." However, large numbers of jobs could be
destroyed by poor policy decisions with respect to robitization. The
tasks presented to policy makers by the information economy are
considerable, and the time for dealing with them is now. We can
have some hope, however, that the policy problems presented by
the computer are solvable. After all, the problem of inventing and
80. G. McKNiHT, COMPUTER CRIME 113-18 (1973).
81. See Joy, supra note 79.
82. See G. McKNIGHT, supra note 80.
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perfecting the technology in the first place was at least as formidable to solve, and we succeeded in that endeavor.

